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THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Albert]. Rosenthal*
Alexander Hamilton characterized the method provided in the Constitution for the selection of the President as
"almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has
escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest
mark of approbation from its opponents," 1 its critics soon made up
for lost time, and it has probably been the subject of more proposed
amendments than any other provision of the Constitution.2 Recent
years have seen an intensification of interest in the subject, reflecting
both widespread concern that a President might be chosen who
was not the leader in popular votes and fear over the dangers of a
stolen or stalemated election. This heightened attention may have
sprung in part from the near crises of 1948 and 1960,3 but undoubtedly it has also been influenced by the rapid growth in the
power and significance of the presidency itself. Evidence for this
may be seen in the fact that of the last six constitutional amendments
adopted, five have concerned the presidency in whole or in part.4
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The author gratefully acknowledges critical suggestions from Professors Louis
Henkin and Alfred Hill, and extensive research assistance from Larry S. Gibson, Esq.,
of the Maryland Bar and the Class of 1967, Mr. Bennett H. Last of the Class of
1968, and Mr. David B. Spanier of the Class of 1969, all of the Columbia Law School.
Since this Article was in page proofs before November 5, it has been possible to
make only minor changes to reflect the results of the most recent presidential election.
The author believes, however, that none of the points made herein need be qualified
in response to that election.
I. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 508 CT• Hamilton ed. 1868) (Hamilton).
2. Through 1966, 513 resolutions proposing amendments to the provisions of the
Constitution pertaining to the election of the President were introduced in Congress.
N. PEIRCE, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT 151 (1968) [hereinafter PEIRCE].
!I. In both of these close elections, a shift of only a few thousand votes in certain
key states would have prevented either major party candidate from obtaining a majority of the electoral votes; a "Dixiecrat" candidate would have held the balance of
power. The election would then have been referred to the House of Representatives,
in which the delegation from each state would have cast one vote, and a majority of
all the states would have been required for election. In each instance, the House was
closely enough divided that a stalemate might well have ensued. See page 15 infra.
There is some doubt as to whether demonstration of the shortcomings of the system
in a recent election is in itself sufficient to induce a change. In five successive elections
from 1876 through 1892, the winning candidate failed to obtain a majority of the
popular vote; in two of them the popular leader lost; in all five an infinitesimal shift
of votes would have reversed the result; and in one (1876) a national crisis was
narrowly averted. Yet the Constitution was not amended. While some modern observers might conclude that the quality of the candidates in those elections was such
that it mattered little who won, it is unlikely that the people of the time so regarded it.
4. The twentieth amendment changed the President's term of office and provided
for the death of the President-elect or his failure to qualify. The twenty-second amendment limited the President to two terms; the twenty-third provided for representation
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Still, the basic method of electing the President has continued almost
without change.
While a wide variety of amendments intended to remove various
apparent shortcomings in the method of selecting our Presidents
have been proposed over the years, the current drive is centered on
the proposal to employ a direct, nationwide, popular vote. This
would eliminate the possibility that the popular favorite might be defeated, as was Grover Cleveland in 1888, by an opponent with fewer
popular but more electoral votes. If coupled with a provision that
less than a majority of the popular votes (for example, 40 per cent)
would suffice for election, or that a runoff election would be held
if no candidate obtained a required percentage, 5 this proposal would
defeat the strategy of regional third-party candidates who seek to
deprive either major party candidate of a majority of electoral votes
and to throw the election into the House of Representatives where a
stalemate could easily result. Finally, a direct popular vote would
also prevent the "theft" of an election by the action of presidential
electors defying the mandate of the voters who had selected them
on the assumption that they would support their party's nominees.
It is not surprising that this proposal has garnered widespread
support. It has been recommended by a prestigious commission of
the American Bar Association6 and endorsed by the ABA's House
of Delegates. The Bar Association of the City of New York,
which had previously recommended a different proposed amendment, 7 has now shifted its support to direct popular vote, 8 as has
Senator Birch Bayh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.9 A
of the District of Columbia in the electoral college; the twenty-fourth eliminated the
poll tax in elections for the President and Congress; and the twenty-fifth provided for
the disability of the President and the designation of a Vice President when that
office is vacant.
Fortunately, few of our recent Presidents have been either drunkards or teetotalers;
hence the twenty-first amendment, repealing Prohibition, cannot be viewed as bearing
with any particular emphasis on the presidency.
5. For example, S.J. Res. 2, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), introduced by Senator Bayh
and a bipartisan group of 18 other senators. See also the recommendations of the
A.B.A. Commission, infra note 6.
6. ABA COMMN. ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT (1967).
See also Feerick, The Electoral College-Why It Ought To Be Abolished, 37 FORDHAM
L. REv. I (1968).
7. The amendment which had been supported by the Association provided for
automatic award of the electoral votes of each state to the candidate securing a
plurality of the popular vote therein, eliminating the presidential electors as such.
See 20 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 503 (1965); text accompanying note 125 infra.
8. 6 REPs. OF COMM. CONCERNED WITH FEDERAL LEGISLATION, Assoc. OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF N.Y. 9 (1967).
9. See note 5 supra; Hearings on S. ]. Res. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 245-46 (1968).
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Gallup poll indicates that 66 per cent of the nation supports this
amendment, with only 19 per cent opposed.10
It must be remembered, however, that a decision to amend the
Constitution is, as a practical matter, usually an irreversible step.11
It is the purpose of this Article to examine the gravity of the evils
sought to be eliminated, the possibility that the proposed amendment might give rise to undesirable side effects, and the availability of alternative remedies.

1. DEFEAT OF THE POPULAR CHOICE
We still choose our chief magistrate by a method which is both
anachronistic and undemocratic. There is much that is attractive
in the view that the President should be chosen by a completely
democratic process-that if the principle of "one man-one vote"
has validity elsewhere it ought to be applied here. For a nation professing dedication to democratic ideals, the selection of its most important officer through a method not completely democratic must,
inevitably, be a source of dissatisfaction. And under any system in
which the presidency is determined by some method other than
direct popular vote, there is necessarily a possibility that the popular
favorite may not win.
There are, however, difficulties with a completely democratic
selection process both in principle and practicality. As an abstract
proposition, complete equality of influence of every voter in the
country might well be a worthy goal. But we are not living under
an abstract proposition. In other parts of the real system under
which we live, voters do not always have equal influence: compare
the Senate. The way in which the President is chosen must be considered in the context of the entire governmental structure rather
than in isolation. Moreover, since there is no real possibility of
achieving total equality in every component of our political life,
it may be particularly pertinent to consider the desirability of
direct popular election of the President in terms of practical consequences as well as democratic theory. What forces in our society
would be strengthened, and what weakened, if the change were
made? Which needs would be likely to be served and which put
aside?
The Founding Fathers, of course, did not contemplate a purely
democratic procedure for choosing the President. The device selected was the product of a compromise between those favoring and
IO. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1968, at 61, col. 2.
I I. Constitutional amendments are difficult to pass. The provisions of the original
Constitution are seldom changed; amendments, by hypothesis more nearly contempo•
rary, are even more difficult to alter once adopted. Only one, the eighteenth, has ever
been repealed.
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those opposing popular participation in the choice; 12 it also reflected
an earlier compromise between the large and the small states as
to congressional representation. 13 Even the right to vote for presidential electors was not assured, since each state could "appoint"
its electors as it saw fit. In fact, in some states-South Carolina until
186014-the legislatures retained this power.
The original constitutional framework has, with minor exceptions, 15 remained unchanged to this day; yet, as a practical matter the manner of presidential selection evolved very quickly into
a form which would have been unrecognizable to the Framers. With
the growth of political parties, the elector soon became a mere
functionary expected to vote for his party's candidates.16 And with
the advance of democracy, each state eventually directed that its
electors be chosen by universal suffrage. However, the electors are
still chosen on a state-by-state basis, and in turn, they elect the
President.17
When the voters first began choosing electors, many states were
divided into electoral districts with the result that if party strength
differed from district to district a mixed delegation of electors was
chosen. A few states, however, employed statewide balloting, and
the party that prevailed in total vote secured the entire electoral
count. This device enabled a state to achieve an influence far greater
than a state whose electoral vote was divided; by a sort of Gresham's
Law, the states in the latter group felt obliged, in self-defense, to
12. See, e.g., 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
132, 166 (1937); L. WILMERDING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 19-22 (1958); Roche, The
Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. Sex. REv. 799, 810-11 (1961);
cf. Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27
LAw & CoNTEMP, PROB. 495, 506 (1962); Truman, Book Review, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 838,
840 (1959). See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 n.8 (1963): "The electoral college
was designed by men who did not want the election of the President to be left to
the people.''
13. PEIRCE 35-37.
14. In 1876 Colorado, just admitted to the Union and perhaps lacking sufficient
time to provide for elections, chose its electors by legislative appointment.
15. Article I, section 2, provided that each elector vote for two persons; the one
with the greatest number of votes (if a majority) became President and the next
highest Vice President. Following the election of 1800, when all Democratic electors
voted for both Jefferson and Burr causing a tie which had to be resolved in the
House of Representatives, the twelfth amendment was adopted providing for separate
balloting for President and Vice President and making several other minor changes.
The fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and
twenty-fifth amendments have all had some bearing on the process of selecting the
President but have not changed the basic mechanical structure set forth in article II,
section I, as amended by the twelfth amendment.
16. J. DOUGHERTY, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 17-18 (1906).
17. Since the electors meet in each of the state capitals, "electoral college" (not a
constitutional phrase) in the singnlar is a misnomer. A single deliberative body was
never contemplated.
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follow suit. Before long, the statewide or "general ticket" method
became universal, and it has seldom been departed from in the
last century.18
Thus, as the system now operates in practice, the candidate
obtaining a plurality19-however small-of a state's popular votes
receives its entire complement of electoral votes. A candidate carrying
a number of states by small margins can therefore prevail over his
opponent whose total popular vote may be greater. Although this
has seldom happened, the possibility cannot be ignored.
Three elections are often cited as examples of the defeat of
the popular favorite-those of 1824, 1876, and 1888. In 1824, the
two-party system had temporarily broken down, and all four candidates-Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William H. Crawford, and Henry Clay-were, nominally at least, Democrats. No
candidate received either a majority of the electoral vote or a majority of the popular vote in the eighteen (out of twenty-four) states in
18. In 1892, the Michigan legislature, controlled by Democrats, correctly foresaw a
statewide victory by the Republican presidential candidate and sought to salvage
something for his Democratic opponent by dividing the state into separate electoral
districts. This was challenged, but sustained by the Supreme Court in McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. I (1892). In 1896 Michigan reverted to the general ticket method.
19. Georgia requires a majority, rather than a mere plurality, of the popular vote, to
elect presidential electors. In the event of a failure of any slate to attain a majority,
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1514 (Supp. 196'7) calls for a run-off between "the two candidates
receiving the highest number of votes." This provision, applicable to other offices as
well, would seem not to be readily adaptable to the election of a number of presidential electors. It replaced GA. CoDE ANN. § 34-2503 (1962), which called, instead, for
appointment of the electors by the state legislature in the event of failure to attain a
majority of the popular vote.
The selection of electors must be made on the first Tuesday after the first Monday
in November, the date set by Congress pursuant to art. II, § 1, par. 4 of the Constitution. It has been held that this constitutional provision also requires that the day be
uniform throughout the nation, and that the receipt and counting of absentee ballots
after that date would violate the requirement of uniformity. Maddox v. Board of
State Canvassers, 116 Mont. 217, 149 P.2d 112 (1944). This would imply that any
run-off election (as provided by Georgia law) would be invalid. But the language
of the Constitution does not compel that interpretation. It reads: "The Congress
may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall
give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States." The
last clause may be regarded as applying only to the "Day" on which the electors are
to give their votes, and not to the "Time" of "chusing the Electors." Congress has
apparently adopted this construction, since it has provided [3 U.S.C. § 2 (1964)]:
"'Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and
has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed
on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct."
See also 3 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
Maryland, while apparently permitting an elector to be chosen by a mere
plurality, until recently required its electors to cast their ballots for the presidential
and vice presidential candidates receiving "the majority of the votes cast in the State
of Maryland." MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 153, 156 (1957). The Election Code of which
this provision was a part was repealed in 1967, and its replacement requires Maryland
electors to vote for the candidates receiving a plurality of the popular vote in the
state, Id. art. 33, § 20-24 (Supp. 1967).
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which the people chose their electors by popular vote. The vote
was divided as follows: 20

Candidate

Popular

Electoral

Jackson
Adams
Crawford
Clay

152,933
115,696
46,979
47,136

99
84
41
37

Pursuant to the Constitution, the choice devolved upon the House
of Representatives, with each state casting one vote and a majority
(thirteen states) necessary for election. Clay threw his support to
Adams, who won on the first ballot. The result has generally been
interpreted as a defeat for democratic principles, and that interpretation was successfully employed by Jackson in his return match
with Adams four years later. But because in six states the electors
were chosen by the legislatures rather than at the polls, and because
of the possibility that Adams may well have been the second choice
of most of the supporters of Clay and Crawford, Adams' election
is not a conclusive case of a defeat of the popular will.
In 1876, by anyone's count, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden secured
a clear popular majority over Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. 21
However, disputes arose in four states, and double sets of returns
were sent to Congress. Apart from the disputed votes, Tilden had
184 electoral votes and Hayes 165; twenty electoral votes were at
stake, and Tilden needed only one of these to win. 22 Congress established an Electoral Commission to resolve the disputes, and the
Commission, by a strict eight-to-seven party vote, found for Hayes
in each instance. Thus, the final count was 185 for Hayes and 184
for Tilden. In this instance, the defeat of the popular choice may
be ascribed to the election frauds which generated the controversy
and to the party-line votes of the Electoral Commission, rather than
to the unresponsiveness of the electoral college to the popular vote.
Yet, even under the Republicans' count of popular votes, Tilden
had a majority; this demonstrates that the system itself could have
20. S. PETERSEN, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
18 (1963) [hereinafter PETERSEN].
21. PEIRCE 87.
22. Colorado's three electors, chosen by the legislature rather than the voters (see
note 14 supra), voted for Hayes. PETERSEN 45, 46. If those electoral votes had not been
counted, Tilden would have had a clear majority of the valid votes, even accepting
the Republicans' position as to all twenty disputed electoral votes. It is striking that
in all of the protracted debate in Congress, in the Electoral Commission, and elsewhere,
the argument never seems to have been advanced that direct appointment by the
legislature was invalid. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. I, 35 (1892).
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thwarted the popular will even if there had been no controverted
returns.
The only apparently clear example of defeat of the popular will
was the election of 1888, in which Grover Cleveland, who led Benjamin Harrison in popular votes, was decisively defeated in the
electoral count. The vote was tabulated as follows: 23

Candidate

Popular

Harrison
Cleveland
Minor Parties

5,445,269
5,540,365
404,205

Electoral
233
168
0

Although neither candidate had a majority of the popular vote, this
would seem to be an unquestionable instance in which the plurality
candidate lost the election. Yet we cannot be certain that, had the
President been elected by direct popular vote, Cleveland necessarily
would have won. If the ground rules regarding election had been
different, the candidates would presumably have campaigned differently, aiming at total votes rather than at carrying critical states. A
larger voter turnout would have been likely in those one-sided
states where interest lagged because the choice of electors was fairly
certain. For example, a more active attempt to bring out Republican
votes in the then solid Democratic South might have been made.
Of course, this could have been outweighed by an even larger turnout of othenvise complacent Democrats. In short, we will never
know.
A significant feature of the 1888 election was that, while Cleveland's 95,096 popular vote plurality availed him nothing, a switch
of a mere 7,189 votes out of well over 1,000,000 in New York would
have swung its thirty-six electoral votes to his column and enabled
him to win by 204 to 197 .24 Ironically, four years earlier, Cleveland
had beaten Blaine by 219 electoral votes to 182, also prevailing
in the popular vote by a margin of 23,737. Yet a shift of 575 votes
in New York would have elected Blaine (218-183), despite Cleveland's nationwide plurality.25
The tremendous potential significance of a handful of votes
in the larger states has not been overlooked; the party conventions
usually choose candidates from the largest states, and campaigns are
tailored to capture their electoral votes. Yet this seemingly swollen
influence of the large-state voter appears inconsistent with the
mathematics of the electoral college. The smaller states seem to be
23. PETERSEN 55.
24. PETERSEN 54.
25. PETERSEN 51-52.
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accorded disproportionately large representation because each state,
regardless of population, is accorded two electoral votes corresponding to its two senators as well as one for each representative; thus,
Alaska casts one electoral vote per 75,389 inhabitants, as contrasted
with California's one per 392,930. 26
Whose vote, then, really does count for more? Does the largestate voter wield more influence than his counterpart in the small
state? Is the answer dictated by the electoral vote/population ratio
or is the instinct of the politicians more accurate? Not until this
year has the solution been forthcoming. In a brilliant mathematical
analysis, John E. Banzhaf, III, has demonstrated algebraically that
the general ticket system accords each large-state voter a greater
chance than his smaller-state counterpart to affect the ultimate result of an election despite his smaller theoretical share of the electoral vote. 27 In effect, the voters in a state may be compared to
participants in a caucus, each of whom agrees to cast his vote in
accordance with the decision of the majority; each thereby gains
potential power, and the larger the number of participants in the
caucus the greater the power. This factor outweighs the higher
electoral vote/population ratio of the smaller states; a voter in California or New York has been calculated to have almost three times
the chance of affecting the final result as a voter in any of several
smaller states.28
Despite the difficulties encountered by the Constitutional Convention in resolving the competing interests of the large and small
states, few issues have polarized the nation along such a dividing
line. Until about twenty years ago, proposals to change the system
were at least ostensibly predicated more upon theoretical objections
to unequal voting power and to the possibility of a popular winner
becoming an electoral-college loser than upon fostering or frustrating any interests supposedly concentrated in a particular group of
states classified by size. Over the years, the types of changes proposed
have taken several forms. A perennial favorite has been the reversal,
by constitutional amendment, of the practice of employing the
general ticket. Mandatory choice of electors by separate districts
within a state was first proposed in 1800 and has since been repeatedly urged; its current champion is Senator Mundt of South Dakota.
A proposal to split each state's electoral vote in proportion to its
popular vote was first offered in 1848; under the sponsorship of
Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and Representative Gossett of Texas
26. These figures are based on the 1960 Census.
27. Banzhaf, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral

College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 304 (1968).
28. Id. at 329.
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it came close to success in 1950, when it carried the Senate by more
than the required two-thirds but died in the House. A combination
of both proposals, whereby a state could choose either procedure
but could not adhere to the present winner-take-all method, picked
up no fewer than fifty-four sponsors in the Senate but nevertheless
failed to carry, largely because of the brilliant opposition of Senator
Paul Douglas and freshman Senator John F. Kennedy. Depending
on the observer's political leanings, he may find poetic justice or
irony in the fact that, under either of the two procedures, Kennedy
probably would have lost to Nixon in 1960.
Pursuant to either the district or the proportional plans, the
small states would retain the mathematical advantage stemming from
their higher electoral vote/population ratios, while the larger states
would lose the advantage of the countervailing "caucus" factor.
Banzhaf has calculated that under the district plan, a voter in
Alaska would have over three times the influence of one in California or New York, and under the proportional plan, over five
times as much. 29
But by the 1950's something new had entered the picture. Theoretical considerations undoubtedly motivated some of the proponents of change, but there were many who openly deplored what
they regarded as the growing influence of urban minority and labor
groups upon the selection of Presidents and their conduct in office.
They attributed this influence to the concentration of electoral votes
in the populous states, where these minority and labor groups
might hold the balance of power.30 While direct election of the
President would have eliminated these supposed discrepancies, the
essentially conservative leadership of the drive for the district and
the proportional amendments soundly defeated direct popular vote
29. Id. at 330, 331.
30. See, e.g., remarks of Congressman Gossett of Texas, in Hearings on Amendment of Constitution To Abolish Electoral College System Before Subcomm. No. 1 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 264-65 (1951):
Now, please understand, I have no objection to the Negro in Harlem voting
and to his vote being counted, but I do resent the fact that both parties will spend
a hundred times as much money to get his vote, and that his vote is worth a
hundred times as much in the scale of national politics as is the vote of a white
man in Texas. I have no objection to a million folks who cannot speak English
voting, or to their votes being counted, but I do resent the fact that because they
happen to live in Chicago, or Detroit, or New York, that their vote is worth a
hundred times as much as mine because I happen to live in Texas. Is it fair, is it
honest, is it democratic, is it to the best interest of anyone in fact, to place such
a premium on a few thousam;l labor votes, or Italian votes, qr Irish votes, or Negro
votes, or Jewish votes, or Polish votes, or Communist votes, or big-city-machine.
votes, simply because they happen to be located in two or three large, industrial
pivotal States? Can anything but evil come from placing .such temptation and
such power in the hands of political parties and political qosses?· They, of course,
will never resist the temptation of making undue appeals to these minority groups
whose votes mean the balance of power and the election of•President. Thus, both
said groups and said politicians are corrupted and the Natioh suffers.

IO
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when it was proposed. 31 Instead, this leadership strove for changes
which would have discriminated against the large-state and large-city
voters in the choice of the President, despite the fact that these
voters already faced disadvantages in the composition of the Senate,
the districting of the House of Representatives, and the apportionment of the state legislatures.
While proposed from time to time over the years, the direct
popular vote amendment has only recently attracted much support.
Hesitation may have sprung from the assumption that the smaller
states would never accept the destruction of their theoretical advantage; since over half of the states partook of that advantage, the
possibility that three fourths of them would ratify such a constitutional amendment seemed remote indeed.32 Other factors, however,
would seem necessary to explain the almost two-to-one vote against
the proposal among 254 heads of university political science departments iffa 1961 survey conducted by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee.33 It may be
that the political scientists were moved by the same consideration asserted by John F. Kennedy in the 1956 Senate debate: "[I]t is not
only the unit vote for the Presidency we are talking about, but a
whole solar system of governmental power. If it is proposed to
change the balance of power of one of the elements of the solar
system, it is necessary to consider all the others."34 Kennedy was
talking about the proposed district or proportional systems, but the
same considerations would apply, albeit with somewhat less force,
to direct popular election.
Of course, Kennedy was speaking-and the political scientists
were voting-before Baker v. Carr,35 Reynolds v. Sims, 36 and Wesberry v. Sanders, 37 which invalidated the subordination of the cities
to the rural areas in the composition of state legislatures and the
House of Representatives. Much of the reason for retaining the
disproportionate influence of the large states (and therefore of the
large cities within those states) 38 in the choice of the President as
31. An amendment introduced by Senator Humphrey in 1950 was defeated 6!1-28.
96 CoNG. REc. 1276-77 (1950). A similar amendment introduced by Senator Lehman in
1956 was also defeated 66-17. 102 CONG. REc. 5657 (1956).
32. See PEIRCE 185; L. WILMERDING, THE ELECI"ORAL COLLEGE 97-98 (1958); Kefauver,
The Electoral College: Old Reforms Take on a New Look, 27 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB,
188, 195-96 (1962).
33. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 691-714 (1961).
34. 102 CONG, REC. 5150 (1956).
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
38. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
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a countervailing inequality to balance their weakness in other
political areas has since disappeared. In the light of these more
recent constitutional developments, a fresh look at the problem is
needed.
Is there any longer a respectable case for opposing direct popular election? I, for one, believe that there is. First of all, it is too
soon to assume that the reapportionment decisions are going to
stick. As the readers of the March 1968 issue of this Review must
be especially aware, a substantial effort has been mounted to reverse
those decisions, either through an ordinary constitutional amendment or through the calling of a new constitutional convention.39
Before the populous states and cities previously prejudiced by malapportionment should be asked to give up whatever advantage they
are accorded by the present method of choosing the President, they
might want some assurance that there will be no reversion to the
dominance of state legislatures and the House by rural interests.40
Apart from the danger of a recrudescence of rural domination
of legislatures and the House, the permanent underrepresentation
of larger states in the Senate is frozen into the Constitution even
beyond the reach of the amending process.41 Each Alaskan's vote
counts seventy-four times as much as each New Yorker's in the
composition of the Senate; by comparison, the advantage accorded
to New Yorkers by the present method of electing the President is
slight indeed. Even without regard to legislative apportionment,
therefore, we still must face the issue which Senator Kennedy raised
in 1956. Too many elements in the "solar system of governmental
power" are still loaded against the voter in the large states to warrant the conclusion that fairness obliges him to give up the one
advantage which he retains.
Perhaps more significant than countervailing inequalities are
the practical consequences of the proposed change. It would scarcely
be prudent to effect a permanent alteration in our political structure
39. Symposium on the Article Ji' Convention Process, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 837-1016
(1968), especially Dirksen, The Supreme Court and the People, id. at 837, and Ervin,

Proposed Legislation To Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution, id. at 875.
40. Attempts to delay the redistricting of congressional seats have also come close
to success. See N.Y. Times, April 28, 1967, at 27, col. 4.
41. ", •• Provided ••• that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CoNsr. art. V. It seems clear that this article, estab•
blishing the amending process, cannot itself be amended to permit destruction of the
guaranty of equal representation of the states in the Senate.
Even the process of amending the Constitution is itself loaded in favor of the
smaller states. Three groups participate in the normal amendment process: the Senate,
the House of Representatives, and the state legislatures. Of these, only the House
comes close to reflecting population; in the Senate and in counting the ratification
votes of the state legislatures, the rule is not one man-one vote, but one state-one vote.
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without careful examination of its probable effects on governmental
processes. What influences would be strengthened, 'what weakened,
if Presidents were to be chosen by direct vote?
The most obvious consequence of the proposed change would be
a reduction in the importance of the large states in the choice of the
President. But, as mentioned above, issues in American politics have
rarely been polarized between large and small states, so at first glance
the change might not seem to be very significant. But large states do
contain large cities; according to the 1960 census, of the eight
largest cities, seven are located, one each, in the seven largest states.42
And the cities, until recently the victims of rural-dominated ap•
portionment of state legislatures and unequal districting in the
House of Representatives, are in serious trouble. To whatever extent our Presidents may be influenced by the voting strength of the
urban voters, it would seem imperative that this influence not be
curtailed.
Even more important, there has in recent years been an enor•
mous influx of Negroes into the cities-to a point where over two
thirds of all Negroes outside of the South are concentrated in our
twelve largest cities,43 with all signs pointing to even further concentration in the future. The appalling conditions imposed upon
all but a tiny fraction of them has been detailed elsewhere.44 The
result is the most serious domestic crisis the nation has had to face
in a century. Can we afford to reduce, even in the slightest, the like•
lihood that the federal government will take the heroic measures
urgently needed to cope with this crisis?45
Changing the method of choosing the President means much
more than turning a potential losing candidate into a winner and
vice versa. The choice of a party candidate reflects at least in part
the judgment of the convention delegates as to his chances for
42. The eight largest cities, in order of population, were New York, New York;
Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Detroit, Michi•
gan; Baltimore, Maryland; Houston, Texas, and Cleveland, Ohio. The seven largest
states were New York, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, and Michigan.
43. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CML DISORDERS 243 (Bantam
ed. 1968) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. According to Banzhaf's computations, all
major cities except Baltimore and Washington, D.C., are in states in which voters have
a greater voice than the national average in the election of the President. Banzhaf,
supra note 27, at 329.
44. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT.
45. See COMMISSION REPORT 455:
The principal burden for funding the programs we have proposed will fall upon
the Federal Government. Caught between an inadequate and shrinking tax base
and accelerating demands for public expenditures, the cities are not able to
generate sufficient financing. Although there is much more that state governments
can and should do, the taxing resources available at this level are far from
adequate.
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victory; under the present structure great attention must necessarily
be paid to the popularity of the candidate with urban and Negro
voters. 46 If we reduce the influence of those voters, we will reduce
the attention which conventions will pay to urban and Negro preferences when nominating candidates. Similarly, an incumbent President seeking re-election-or hoping that his successor will be of the
same party-will probably pay more attention to urban and Negro
needs under the present system than if the balance of power were
changed.
The plight of the cities is becoming increasingly desperate.
Racial tensions seem to be worsening rapidly. Compared with the
magnitude of the problems, little enough has been done about them
even under existing rules. Should the rules be changed in a way
which will undoubtedly diminish just those influences which might
prod us toward implementing the measures we so badly need? 47
Advocates of direct popular vote do not rest their case on equalization of voting power alone. They point out two additional weaknesses in the present system which would be cured by their proposed
amendment: the possibility of a standoff in the electoral college
followed by a stalemate in the House of Representatives, and the
danger that a sufficient number of electors to deprive the apparently
victorious candidate of the presidency will vote contrary to the expectation of the voters. Do these dangers, considered together or
separately, justify adoption of the proposed amendment?
46. Possible illustrations include: President Franklin Roosevelt's alleged instruction, "Clear it with Sidney [Hillman]," with respect to the Democratic nomination for
Vice President in 1944-probably resulting in the choice of Truman over Byrnes; the
Republican nomination of Eisenhower rather than Taft in 1952 (even if based on
misconceptions as to the farmer's political philosophy); and Kennedy's victory over
Johnson and others in the 1960 Democratic Convention. This factor seems to have
been less influential in the 1968 Conventions. See also note 30 supra.
47. ,ve have no assurance, of course, that the leverage now exercised by the large
states will continue to be applied in favor of improvement of the condition of Negroes.
Disquieting signs of "backlash" have appeared in some of these states. At the least,
however, political concentration upon the vote in the "swing" states should serve to
keep attention upon the sore spots in our society.
The time may come when leadership of the civil rights movement will pass to the
small towns, or even to a new generation of liberals in the South. It is fair to assume,
however, that for the time being at least the voting power of the metropolitan areas
will weigh in the balance in favor of the amelioration of the plight of the Negroesand of the cities as well.
There are additional political consequences, of possibly undesirable character, which
may follow adoption of direct popular election of the President, but which are beyond
the scope of this Article. For example, some feel that the two-party system, with its
tendency to exclude doctrinaire extremism and one-issue parties from the mainstream
of American politics, may be jeopardized if this change is made. Compare Brown,
Proposed Amendment a Power Vacuum for Political Blackmail!, TRIAL June/July
1967, at 15, with REPORT OF THE A.B.A. CoMMN. ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM 5-6
(1967).
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CONTINGENT ELECTION PROCEDURE

Criticism has perennially been directed at the procedures applicable if no candidate secures a majority of the electoral vote. In
such cases, the election is thrown into the House of Representatives,
which must choose among the three leading candidates. In the
House, each state's delegation casts one vote, and the votes of a
majority of states (twenty-six today) are required for election.
Only twice has this procedure been invoked48-and not since
1824-but there have been several near misses. A third-party candidate whose total popular vote is large but evenly spread throughout the nation may not secure any electoral votes and thus could
not normally prevent one of the major party nominees from attaining a majority in the electoral college.49 The danger arises from
a regional candidate, such as George Wallace, who carried five
Southern states; if the major party candidates run closely enough, a
candidate like Wallace can hold the balance of power. There is
reason to believe that this was a major purpose of the Wallace candidacy and of the campaigns of his "Dixiecrat" predecessors. If a
standoff in the electoral college were followed by a stalemate in
the House, Wallace would have presumably tried to trade his support to one of the major party candidates in return for assurances
of retrogression on civil rights and perhaps for promises to appoint
conservatives (or even racists) to the Supreme Court and to other
sensitive positions such as that of the Attorney General.
If there is no majority in the electoral college, it is highly
unlikely that there will be a majority of states supporting one
candidate in the House. This conclusion does not rest solely upon
the probability that the political complexion of each state's congressional delegation will resemble the distribution of its presidential
vote. If the delegation of a state is evenly divided it can cast no
vote; yet a majority of all the states, voting or not, is necessary to
elect a President. Under the current apportionment, twenty-nine of
48. In 1800, all Democratic electors voted for both Jefferson and Burr, resulting
in a tie. In the House of Representatives, eight states initially voted for Jefferson,
six for Burr, and two were tied-giving no candidate the necessary majority of nine
out of the total sixteen states. It was not until the thirty-sixth ballot that Jefferson
prevailed.
The other such case, in 1824, is discussed in the text accompanying note 20 supra.
John Quincy Adams was chosen on the first ballot in the House, but only following
considerable maneuvering on behalf of the respective candidates.
49. Since there are usually an odd number of Representatives and an even number
of Senators, until recently there would generally have been an odd total of electors.
In 1961, however, the twenty-third amendment accorded the District of Columbia
what will almost always be three electoral votes, thus resulting in an even total of
votes and a possibility of a tie even when there are only two candidates obtaining
electoral votes.
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the fifty states are assigned an even number of representatives; in
a close year, at least a few evenly split delegations are inevitable.
Such a stalemate almost occurred in 1948. Truman led Dewey by
over 2,000,000 popular votes, and by 303 electoral votes to 189.
The State's Rights candidate, Strom Thurmond, garnered only
slightly more than 1,000,000 votes but carried four states and
secured thirty-nine electoral votes. Hence, no resort to the House
was necessary. But if there had been a small shift in the popular
vote in key states, 50 there would have been no electoral vote majority. Assuming that all representatives would have supported the
candidates of their respective parties and that the delegations from
the states carried by Thurmond would have supported him, the
House vote would have been: 51

Candidate
Truman
Dewey
Thurmond
Evenly Divided

States
21
20
4
3

· How the impasse would have been resolved is a matter, fortunately,
only of conjecture. Edward S. Corwin has remarked that we continue to rely "on the intervention of that Providence which is said
to have fools and the American people in its special care." 52
Again in 1960, a shift of only 9,421 votes in Illinois and Missouri,
or several other combinations of small numbers of votes in other
states, 53 would have thrown the election into the House of Representatives with no clear assurance as to the outcome there. Certainly,
the present method for contingent election is unsatisfactory-indeed,
it is dangerous. As Professor Paul J. Piccard stated: "A certain
amount of perseverance is needed in order to discover something
good to say about the possibility of an election of the President by
the House of Representatives." 54 But it does not follow that the
entire electoral system must be overhauled merely to eliminate
this one undesirable feature. If the advocates of change are motivated primarily by fear of the success-this year or some year-of
a Wallace-type candidate in stalemating the election, their purpose
can be achieved by curing the objectionable part of the procedure.
50. For example, a shift of only 12,487 votes in California and Ohio. PETERSEN 102.
51, See Wechsler, Presidential Elections and the Constitution: A Comment on Proposed Amendment, 35 A.B.A.J. 181 (1949).
52, E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 67 (1957).
53. PETERSEN 112.
54. Piccard, The Resolution of Electoral Deadlocks by the House of Representatives,
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Any number of remedies suggest themselves. The simplest might
be to reduce the portion of the electoral vote needed for election
of the candidate receiving a plurality from an absolute majority to
something less-40 per cent or one third. American electoral practices with respect to the requirement of a majority, as distinguished
from a mere plurality, have been ambivalent; in most instances,
pluralities are sufficient. In almost all states, we choose our Senators,
Representatives, and governors by plurality vote. 65 And within each
state except Georgia,56 a plurality is sufficient to elect the presidential
electors themselves. The winners of fifteen presidential elections07
have received less than a majority of the popular vote; indeed, this
was true in nine of thirteen elections from 1844 to 1892, and has
again been true in 1948, 1960, and 1968.
Another solution would be to call an immediate run-off election
between the two leading candidates, with all electors required to
vote for one or the other. 58 Still another alternative which would
work in most though not all cases would be to replace the contingent election by states in the House of Representatives with a joint
session of the House and the Senate, in which each senator and
representative would vote as an individual.59 In brief, there is no
shortage of possible remedies for this part of the problem, and there
is no need to throw out the entire system to cure one objectionable
element.
III. THE

FAITHLESS ELECTOR

The third weakness in the present system for choosing the President springs from the possibility that presidential electors will
vote contrary to the assumption of the voters who selected them. If
in SELECTING THE PRESIDENT: THE TWENTY·SEVENTH DISCUSSION AND
(Aly ed. 1953-1954), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 33, at 826, 828.

DEBATE MANUAL

55. The Georgia Constitution has an unusual provision that if no candidate for
governor receives a majority of the votes, the General Assembly shall choose the
governor from between the two candidates with the largest number of votes. This
provision was sustained by the Supreme Court in Fortson v, Morris, 385 U.S. 231
(1966). The requirement of a majority in primary elections is common in the South
but not elsewhere in the country.
56. See note 19 supra.
57. Those elections were in 1824, 1844, 1848, 1856, 1860, 1876, 1880, 1884, 1888,
1892, 1912, 1916, 1948, 1960, and 1968.
58. This proposal is being strenuously urged by Congressman Jonathan Bingham
of New York. See Bingham, Keep It out of the Housel, ATLANTIC, Sept., 1968, at 85.
59. This alternative was apparently first proposed by James Madison in 1823.
Piccard, supra note 54, at 840. It has also been included in amendments advocated by
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson which would abolish the electoral college and
substitute automatic computation of the electoral vote of each state in favor of the
candidate polling a plurality of the popular vote therein. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 58, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1965); H.R.J. Res. 278, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1965). See also text
accompanying note 125 infra.
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such action on the part of a sufficient number of electors were to
reverse the decision of the voters, the ensuing dispute over the
legitimacy of the election of a new President might well inflict grave
injuries upon the nation. If we assume that discretion on the part
of electors to override the expectations of their constituents must
be eliminated, there are three possible ways in which this may be
accomplished: by the courts under existing law, by statute, or by
constitutional amendment.
The Founding Fathers intended the electors to be free agents, 60
but they did not foresee the growth of political parties. Hamilton's
concept of the electors as "men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station ... likely to possess the information and
discernment requisite to such complicated investigations" 61 did not
accurately reflect the situation for long. In 1788 and 1792 ·washington was everyone's choice anyway. By 1796, political parties were
evolving, and electors were being pledged to support their respective
parties' candidates. In that year, Samuel Miles, a Federalist elector
from Pennsylvania, voted for Jefferson instead of Adams, evoking this
comment from a Federalist voter: "Do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be
President? Nol I chuse him to act, not to think." 62 By 1800, party
discipline had already evolved to a point where it caused the Democrats acute embarrassment. In that year, each of their electors dutifully voted for both Jefferson and Burr, causing a tie that could be
resolved only with the assistance of some of the Federalist members
of the House of Representatives. 63 "With the removal of this problem
by the twelfth amendment, the compulsion for the strict adherence
to party mandate grew even stronger.
In 1820, elector Samuel Plumer-contrary to the expectations qf
his constituents-voted for John Quincy Adams instead of James
Monroe, thereby preventing Monroe from sharing Washington's distinction of being the unanimous choice of the electoral college. But
apart from some unclear cases arising from the four-way election of
1824,64 there has not until recently been a single subsequent instance
of an elector following his own bent. 6:; Indeed, in 1876, when James
60. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232-33 (1952) Oustice Jackson dissenting); THE
No. 68 (Hamilton).
61. THE F.EDERALisr No. 68, at 508-09 0- Hamilton ed. 1868).
62. E. STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY 51 (1928).
63. See notes 15 and 48 supra.
64. See PEIRCE 123.
65. As Thomas Hart Benton wrote, in S. REP. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826):
In the first election held under the constitution, the people looked beyond these
agents [electors], fixed upon their own candidates for President and Vice President,
and took pledges from the electoral candidates to obey their will. In every subsequent election, the same thing has been done. Electors, therefore, have not

FEDERALisr
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Russell Lowell, a Republican elector from Massachusetts, might have
cast his vote for Tilden and thereby spared the nation the crisis that
followed, 66 he felt obliged not to do so. He wrote to Leslie Stephen:
In my own judgment I have no choice, and am bound in honor
to vote for Hayes, as the people who chose me expected me to do.
They did not choose me because they had confidence in my judgment, but because they thought they knew what that judgment would
be. If I had told them that I should vote for Tilden, they would
never have nominated me. It is a plain question of trust. The provoking part of it is that I tried to escape nomination all I could, and
only did not decline because I thought it would be making too much
fuss over a trifle. 61
As Justice Jackson stated in 1952:
Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially became voluntary party lackeys and intellectual
nonentities to whose memory we might justly paraphrase a tuneful
satire:
"They always voted at their Party's call
And never thought of thinking for themselves at all."
As an institution the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost indistinguishable from rigor mortis. os
Three electors have voted contrary to mandate in recent years. In
1948, Preston Parks appeared on two slates in Tennessee, one committed to Truman and one to Thurmond. Although the Truman
ticket carried the state, Parks cast his vote for Thurmond. In 1956,
W. F. Turner, a Democratic elector in Alabama, cast his vote for
Walter E. Jones, a local judge, instead of supporting Adlai Stevenson,
the party nominee. In these cases, as with Samuel Plumer in 1820,
the votes involved had no consequence, and the purpose of the electors was apparently to make a gesture rather than to affect the choice
of the President. But in 1960 a much more disquieting incident
occurred.
Shortly after election day, one Lea Harris of Montgomery, Alabama, circularized the newly chosen electors, urging them to withhold
electoral votes from Kennedy (and Nixon as well) and to agree upon
a ticket acceptable to conservative sentiment, particularly in the
South. As one of several such tickets, Harris suggested Byrd for
answered the design of their institution. They are not the independent body and
superior characters which they were intended to be. They are not left to the
exercise of their own judgment; on the contrary, they give their vote, or bind
themselves to give it, according to the will of their constituents. they have degenerated into mere agents, in a case which requires no agency, and where the
agent must be useless, if he is faithful, and dangerous, if he is not.
66. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
67. 2 H. SCUDDER, JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL 216-17 (1901).
68. Dissenting, in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952).
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President and Goldwater for Vice President. One Republican elector,
Henry D. Irw'in of Oklahoma, sent out further solicitations of his
own. In the end, however, he alone switched, and since his vote
represented a shift from Nixon to Byrd it did not diminish Kennedy's
majority. Called to testify before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee
considering constitutional amendments relating to the election of the
President, Irwin claimed to have had the "tacit support" of the
Republican National Committee, but on cross-examination it was
established that he had garnered little more than vague expressions
of sympathy from a few national committeemen and had been rebuffed in many quarters. 69 But it is disquieting to speculate on what
a better-organized campaign to subvert electors might have achieved,
or what Messrs. Harris and Irwin themselves might have accomplished if Kennedy had had only, say, two or three instead of thirtyfour electoral votes over the 269 necessary for a majority.
Still, four runaway electors in 144 years is not very many, especially when balanced against the 15,245 electoral votes70 cast in all
the elections between 1820 and 1964. Adherence to party candidates
is still, ovenvhelmingly, the norm. The insignificance of the electors
is reflected in the election laws of thirty-five states, which do not even
list them on the ballots or voting machines. Instead, these states recite
the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, in
some cases prefaced by the phrase "Electors for." 71 Clearly, the people
believe they are voting for the President, and on the Wednesday after
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November the newspapers
unhesitatingly report the election results with complete confidence
that the electoral vote will be cast in accordance with the preferences
of the voters.
Despite this solidly established practice of fidelity on the part of
electors, suppose a plan such as that of Messrs. Harris and Invin
were to succeed, and a sufficient number of electors voted contrary
to pledge or expectation to defeat the candidate who would have
won and confer victory upon his opponent. Can the Constitution be
regarded as having been changed by almost two centuries of nearly
consistent practice, so that the preference of the voters can take precedence over the decision of the electors? And even if the disobedient
vote of an elector is regarded as legally improper, is there an effective
judicial remedy for its correction?
The first question is whether such an unfaithful vote would be
illegal at all. Certainly, electors' discretion conforms to the original
69. See Hearings, supra note 33, at 562-656.
70. PEIRCE 124.
71. PEIRCE 338.
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concept of the Framers72 and has never been changed by explicit
constitutional amendment. Can the practice of the ensuing years be
deemed nevertheless to have amended the Constitution to the point
where an elector who attempted to vote contrary to the voters' mandate would be deemed to have violated a legal, as distinguished from
a moral, obligation? The Constitution is an evolving instrument, but
can it evolve to a point diametrically opposite its original import?
A lower New York court once answered this question affirmatively. In Thomas v. Cohen, 73 a voter challenged the constitutionality
of the practice of putting only the names of the presidential and
vice-presidential candidates on the voting machines, arguing that
since he was voting for electors who would be free to exercise discretion he had a right to know for whom he was voting. While conceding
that the Framers intended electors to use their own judgment, the
court concluded that intervening history had imposed a legal obligation on the electors to vote for their parties' nominees:
The electors are expected to choose the nominee of the party they
represent, and no one else. So sacred and compelling is that obligation upon them, so long has its observance been recognized by faithful performance, so unexpected and destructive of order in our land
would be its violation, that the trust that was originally conferred
upon the electors by the people, to express their will by the selections
they make, has, over these many years, ripened into a bounden duty
-as binding upon them as if it were written into the organic law.
The elector who attempted to disregard that duty could, in my opinion, be required by mandamus to carry out the mandate of the
voters of his State.74
The court relied75 on a quotation from Chief Justice Hughes' opinion
in Smiley v. Holm: "General acquiescence cannot justify departure
from the law, but long and continuous interpretation in the course
of official action under the law may aid in removing doubts as to its
meaning." 76 Since the New York court conceded, however, that the
original intention was clear, the use of practical construction to alter
it would seem to go well beyond Hughes' reference. It should be
noted in passing that the practice of omitting the electors' names
from the ballot might have been sustained without deciding that the
electors no longer have discretion. The practice was upheld in Ohio,
72. The requirement in both art. II, § 1 and the twelfth amendment that the
electors "vote by ballot" may be regarded as implying a written, secret vote, adding
further support for the notion of untrammeled discretion. But, "by common practice
since the earliest days, the ballot is not secret and sometimes is not even a ballot at all."
PEIRCE 129-30.
73. 146 N.Y. Misc. 836, 262 N.Y. Supp. 320 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
74. 146 N.Y. Misc. at 841-42, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 326.
75. 146 N.Y. at 846, 262 N.Y. Supp. at 330-31.
76. 285 U.S. 355, 369 (1932).
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for example, on the basis of the broad authority conferred upon the
states by the Constitution to direct the manner in which electors are
to be chosen.77
Thomas v. Cohen stands almost alone. 78 The issue has seldom
arisen squarely, but dicta in a number of state court decisions indicate that the discretion of the electors still endures.79 The Supreme
Court has never passed on the issue, but it arose tangentially in Ray
v. Blair80 in 1952.
Alabama had authorized political parties to choose their respective presidential electors in a state-controlled party primary election
and to fix the qualifications for the candidates. The State Executive
Committee of the Democratic Party required all candidates for
presidential elector to take a pledge to support the nominees of their
party's national convention. One Edmund Blair refused to take such
a pledge, and the Executive Committee refused to certify him as a
candidate. He obtained from the Alabama courts a mandamus directing the chairman of the Executive Committee to certify him as
a candidate for elector in the forthcoming primary, and the state
supreme court upheld the mandamus on the ground that the pledge
requirement was an unconstitutional restriction on an elector's discretion to vote as he chose in the electoral college.81
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed in a five-to-two
decision, declaring:
77. State ex rel. Hawke v. Myers, 132 Ohio St. 18, 4 N.E.2d 397 (1936).
78. State ex rel. Nebraska Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313,
325, 138 N.W. 159, 163 (1912), may also be regarded as premised upon the notion of a
legal duty on the part of electors to support their party's nominees. Theodore
Roosevelt won the 1912 Nebraska Republican preference primary, but Taft received
the national Republican nomination. Six Roosevelt supporters who had been nominated by the Republican Party as Nebraska electors were also chosen as the nominees
of the state Progressive Party. The petitioner was awarded a peremptory writ of
mandamus to compel the secretary of state to print the names of other persons as
Republican candidates for electors instead of the six Roosevelt men. The Nebraska
supreme court affirmed on the ground that the six had forfeited their position as
Republican candidates by accepting the Progressive nomination. The court stated:
Here the persons who have been nominated as presidential electors, having, if
elected, but a single duty to perform, viz., to vote for the candidates nominated
by the party by whose votes they were themselves nominated, openly declare that
they will not perform that duty, but will vote for the candidates of another and
distinctly antagonistic party. This would make performance of their duty impossible, and a judicial determination of the existence of a vacancy was, therefore,
unnecessary. The candidates had by their own acts, vacated their places as Re•
publican presidential electors.
See also Johnson v. Coyne, 47 S.D. 138, 142, 196 N.W. 492, 493 (1923), holding that
despite a state law permitting only one office for each nominating petition, a single
petition for an entire slate of electors was valid, because "presumably this group
stands as a unit for one candidate for President."
79. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, No. 87, 250 Ala. 399, 400, 34 S.2d 598, 600
(1948); Breidenthal v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332, 337, 46 P. 469, 470 (1896); State ex rel.
Beck v. Hummel, 150 Ohio St. 127, 146, 80 N.E.2d 899, 908 (1948).
80. 343 U.S. 214.
81. 257 Ala. 151, 57 S.2d 395 (1952).
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A state's or a political party's exclusion of candidates from a party
primary because they will not pledge to support the party's nominees is a method of securing party candidates in the general election,
pledged to the philosophy and leadership of that party. It is an
exercise of the state's right to appoint electors in such manner,
subject to possible constitutional limitations, as it may choose. U. S.
Const., Art. II, § l,82
The Court went on to point out that pledges to support party
nominees were common from the earliest days of the Republic:
This long-continued practical interpretation of the constitutional
propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate
for elector as to his vote in the electoral college weighs heavily in
considering the constitutionality of a pledge, such as the one here
required, in the primary.
However, even if such promises of candidates for the electoral
college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed
constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II,
§ I, to vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would not
follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional. sa
Justice Jackson's dissent, joined by Justice Douglas, pointed out
the atrophied independence of the elector, 84 but nevertheless declared that "the balloting [of the electors in the electoral college]
cannot be constitutionally subject to any such control because it was
intended to be free, an act performed after all functions of the electoral process left to the states have been completed." 85 He added:
It may be admitted that this law does no more than to make a
legal obligation of what has been a voluntary general practice. If
custom were sufficient authority for amendment of the Constitution
by Court decree, the decision in this matter would be warranted.
Usage may sometimes impart changed content to constitutional generalities, such as "due process of law," "equal protection," or "commerce among the states." But I do not think powers or discretions
granted to federal officials by the Federal Constitution can be forfeited by the Court for disuse. A political practice which has its origin
in custom must rely upon custom for its sanctions.86
Two Justices thus indicated squarely that they regarded the elector's
freedom of choice to be untrammeled. The majority did not directly
reach the issue.
Thus, the question of whether a state may bind the vote of an
elector is still open. At least thirteen states87 and the District of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

343
343
See
343
343

U.S. at 227.
U.S. at 229-30.

text accompanying notes 60-71 supra.
U.S. at 233.
U.S. at 233.
ALAsKA STAT. § 15.30.090 (1962); CAL. ELECTIONS

CODE §

25105 (West 1961);
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Columbia88 now have legislation which may be regarded as doing so,
and it can be argued that all thirty-five states which omit the names
of the electors from the ballot implicitly do the same thing. 89 While
the Supreme Court has not been noticeably reluctant in recent years
to invalidate the laws of large numbers of states when issues of civil
rights or civil liberties have been involved, there is nevertheless a
heavy presumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislation the
enactment of which has been widespread. It may follow that there is
a stronger case for upholding a restriction on the freedom of electors
where it has been decreed by state legislation than where it has not.
Thomas v. Cohen is all the more remarkable for having been decided
as it was in the absence of express statutory provisions purporting to
bind the electors.
Apart from the long-standing practice of elector fealty and the
state legislation on the subject, there are two additional points which
might add strength to the case for binding electors. First, Congress
itself has in one area attempted to bind electors. The twenty-third
amendment was adopted in 1961, providing for representation of the
District of Columbia in the electoral college, and declaring:
The District ... shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may
direct [a designated number of electors who] shall be considered,
for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to
be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District
and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of
amendment.90

Congress promptly enacted implementing legislation prescribing the
procedures for participation by the District of Columbia in presidential elections, stating in pertinent part: "Each person elected as elecCoLo. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 49-20-1(5) (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. § 9-176 (1967); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 103.021 (Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. LAws § 11-221 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 34-904 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 20-4 (Supp. 1967); NEV. R.Ev.
STAT. §§ 298.050 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-10-1.1 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 519-21 (Supp. 1967); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 248.355 (Replacement Part 1965); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-403 (1956). See also VA. CooE ANN. § 24-290.6 (1950), declaring how
electors are "expected" to vote. None of these laws appears to have come before
the courts.
88. D.C. CODE ANN. § l-1108(g) (1967).
89. While some of these state laws prescribe criminal punishment for violation of
an elector's pledge, none e.xpressly purports to reverse his vote in such a case.
A law which would fully test legislative power over elector discretion would be
one which automatically forfeited his office upon casting a defecting vote. Other
electors or party officials could be authorized to fill the vacancy on the spot. His
initial appointment would have been conditional upon his performing his promise.
This would require open voting and would certainly encounter a contention that
the balloting must be secret.
Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27
l.AW 8e CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 509 (1962).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
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tor of President and Vice President shall, in the presence of the
Board, take an oath or solemnly affirm that he will vote for the
candidates of the party he has been nominated to represent, and it
shall be his duty to vote in such manner in the electoral college." 91
This would seem to reflect a determination by Congress either that
all electors are bound to vote for their party's candidates, or that
since the states are empowered to bind electors so to vote, Congress,
acting like a state legislature with respect to the District of Columbia, can do the same. We therefore have what might be regarded as
a contemporaneous construction of a constitutional amendment by
Congress, which, although not necessarily decisive, 92 should be accorded great weight. 93 But the construction is contemporaneous
only with respect to the twenty-third amendment, while its principal significance lies in connection with the much more ancient
article II, section I, and the twelfth amendment.
Second, the twenty-fourth amendment, ratified in 1964, abolishing the poll tax in connection with presidential and congressional
elections, speaks of the right to vote "in any primary or other election
for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress . . . ." 94 The
legislative history does not explain why it was deemed necessary to
include the italicized phrase, but a possible inference is that Congress
and the ratifying states regarded the voters, at least in those states
not listing the electors on the ballot, as voting directly for the President and Vice President. 95 If so, the argument that the electors are
bound would seem to be strengthened.
None of the foregoing adds up to a clear case for the proposition
that the elector is bound to vote for his party's choices, or even that
the state legislatures may so bind him. But there seems to be at least
a respectable argument for either of these propositions. 96 Let us
91. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-ll0B(g) (1967) (emphasis added) (derived from Act of Oct.
4, 1961, 75 Stat. 818).
92. Cf., e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
93. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819); Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
94. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XXIV.
95. Another possible purpose might have been to cover presidential preference
primaries, where held. Cf. Hearings on S. ]. Res. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., I 45 (1968).
96. See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1, 12 (1934):
[W]herever there are today established practices "under" or "in accordance with"
the Document, it is only the practice which can legitimatize the words as being
still part of our going Constitution. It is not the words which legitimatize the
practice. This is the first principle of a sane theory of our constitutional law. Its
necessity is patent wherever practice has flatly abrogated a portion of this "supreme law of the land." Discretion in the electoral college is the classic jnstance;
can any doubt that if that college should today disregard therr mandate, such action
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assume that our constitutional system has indeed evolved to a point
where the elector is no longer free. How would his obligation to
honor the voters' mandate be enforced in a concrete case?
Thus far, in those few instances in which an elector disregarded
his party mandate, the results of the election were unaffected; there
was no interest in instituting litigation to compel or reverse his
vote.D 7 Suppose, however, that in a close election a sufficient number
of electors were persuaded, or even bribed, to vote in such fashion
as to deprive the apparent winner of a majority in the electoral college-either throwing the election into the House of Representatives or handing victory to the apparent loser. Would, and could,
the courts act to prevent such a "theft" of the presidency?
First of all, let us assume a case in which the intention of the
runaway electors was manifested in advance. Presumably actions
would be instituted, in either the state or federal courts, to test the
propriety of their expected conduct.
As for state court actions, a case might be based either on the
theory that the Constitution now forbids elector discretion or on a
state statute purporting to restrict it; in the latter case, the constitutionality of the state statute would of course be an issue. In any event,
it would not be safe to generalize as to whether state courts would
find that a candidate, state official, voter, or taxpayer has sufficient
standing to raise the issue. Moreover, it is not clear whether relief
in mandamus or by way of injunction could be granted. While
mandamus would seem appropriate enough to test the contention
that the duties of electors are purely ministerial, there may be doubt
as to the propriety of mandamus where the time for the official to act
has not yet arrived. 98 And there may still be some vitality in the discredited doctrine that injunctions are not granted to protect mere
political rights.DD Mere declaratory relief, without sanction, might not
be a sufficient deterrent. If what is really sought is a quick dispositive
ruling by the United States Supreme Court, there would be no way
would be contrary to our Constitution? Yet "vote by ballot"-the original language,
repeated in the Twelfth Amendment-is a strange way of saying "act as rubber
stamps." [Emphasis in the original].
For an interesting and persuasive argument that state power to bind electors would
implement, rather than defeat, the purposes of the Framers, see Note, State Power To
Bind Presidential Electors, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 696 (1965); cf. Kirby, Limitations on the
Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections, 27 I.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB,
495, 505-06 (1962).
97. In each such instance, Congress counted the electoral votes as actually cast.
98. While one frequently encounters the statement that even where the duty of a
public official is merely ministerial, mandamus will not lie if the violation of duty
has not yet occurred but has merely been threatened for the future [see, e.g., 55 C.J.S.
MANDAMUS § 33 (1948)], it is doubtful whether most courts would refuse to grant
mandamus on that ground. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Smith, 206 N.Y. 231,
241, 99 N.E. 568, 571 (1912).
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to ensure that the delay involved in appeals through the state judicial
system would not exhaust, many times over, the precious few days
remaining before the electors were to cast their ballots.100
Federal court actions would seem to offer more hope. Baker v.
Carr101 probably assures standing to voters alleging that their votes
are about to be nullified.102 Since electors have been characterized as
state rather than federal officials,103 even though they perform a federal function, the mandamus jurisdiction conferred by section 1311
of the Judicial Code104 would probably be inapplicable. Injunctive
relief, however, would appear to be available under section 1343(3)
of the Judicial Code, which reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ...
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.105
If, as we are assuming arguendo, a voter has a constitutional right to
cast an effective vote for President, an elector who casts his ballot
contrary to the voters' mandate may be said to be acting under color
of state law to deprive the voters of that constitutional right. While
section 1343 was intended primarily to implement the Reconstruction amendments,106 and while the limitations on state action under
the Reconstruction amendments dwarf those under all other provisions of the Constitution, the provision has nevertheless been used
occasionally to redress deprivations of other constitutional rights.107
99. See Note, Injunctive Protection of Political Rights in the Federal Courts, 62
HARV. L. REv. 659, 666-67 (1949); cf. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486, 488 (1903).
100. Supreme Court review of state court decisions may apply only to "[f]inal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could
be had ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
101. 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962).
102. A candidate himself would apparently also have standing to raise the question.
103. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1952).
104. 28 u.s.c. § 1311 (1964).
105. 28 u.s.c. § 1343(3) (1964).
106. See Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1900).
107. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939) (opinion of Justice Stone) (The
test is whether the "gist of the cause of action was not damage or injury to property,
but unconstitutional infringement of a right of personal liberty not susceptible of
valuation in money.'); Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 105 Fed.
536 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900) (full faith and credit clause).
28 U.S.C. § 133I(a) (1964) might also confer jurisdiction upon federal district
courts, since the action seemingly "arises under the Constitution ••• of the United
States," but the $10,000 jurisdictional amount would probably defeat any plaintiff
other than the presidential or vice-presidential candidates themselves.
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The losing party in an action under section 1343 could seek
speedy Supreme Court review by immediately docketing an appeal
in the court of appeals and asking the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari before decision by the court of appeals pursuant to section
1254(1) of the Judicial Code.108 I£ the Supreme Court were willing,
it could also render a quick decision in advance of the preparation
of full opinions. 10 0
It is far from clear, however, whether the Supreme Court would
either consider the case or permit lower federal or state courts to
do so. There is a serious chance that the action would be barred as
raising a "political question." Although Baker v. Carr held the political question doctrine inapplicable in one type of voting rights case
(state legislative apportionment), the Court stated that "it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship
to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.' " 110 While
issues of federal-state relationships are obviously present in an action
challenging the vote of an unfaithful elector, the main problem
involves the intrusion of the courts into a decision-making process
which arguably has been committed finally to Congress. The twelfth
amendment requires the electors in each state to sign and certify
lists of their votes for President and Vice President
and transmit [them] sealed to the seat of government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;-The President of the
Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall
be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number
of Electors appointed ....111
This is not definitely a final commitment to Congress of the power
to resolve disputed votes, but it has some of the hallmarks of one. In
using the passive voice-"the votes shall then be counted"-the
Framers broke one of the cardinal rules of draftsmanship; 112 yet it
108. 28 u.s.c. § 1254(1) (1964).
109. For examples of announcement of the decision prior to publication of the
opinion in cases involving presidential elections, see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,
22 n.l (1892); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154, full opinion delivered, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
While an attempt might be made, instead, to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that a state would be a proper plaintiff, and even
more improbable that either the United States or another state would be the appropriate defendant.
110. 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
111. U.S. CONsr. amend. XII.
112. "The famous phrase of the Constitution 'the votes shall then be counted' has
been like an apple of discord almost since the beginning of the Government." J.
DOUGHERTY, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF nm UNITED STATES 254 (1906). The respective
roles of the Vice President and of the two houses of Congress were the subject of
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seems clear that the counting shall be done by the President of the
Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) or by some
individual, committee, or the whole of the legislative branch. On the
other hand, it can be argued that "[t]he person having the greatest
number of votes" connotes an objective standard, and is not the same
as saying "the person having the greatest number of votes, as so
counted."
In any event, Congress has taken this function unto itself.
While disagreements in the past concerned the credentials of opposing slates of electors rather than the validity of votes cast by electors
whose title to the office was undisputed, nevertheless Congress itself
established the procedures whereby the Hayes-Tilden imbroglio was
decided113 and has since enacted permanent legislation purporting
to regulate future disputes. 114
In McPherson v. Blacker, 115 an 1892 decision in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld Michigan's statute providing for the
district system for selection of electors, counsel for the state contended that the "political question" doctrine barred court action.
The Court rejected this contention for the reason that "the validity
of the state law was drawn in question as repugnant to [the United
States] constitution and laws, and its validity was sustained."116 A
mere recital of the statutory basis for what was then the jurisdiction
of the Court on writ of error does not meet the "political question"
contention; the doctrine is normally invoked in cases in which the
statutory basis for jurisdiction is undisputed. If the vote of an
unfaithful elector were challenged today, the statutory basis would
be present in a federal district court, or in the Supreme Court on
review from either a lower federal court or the highest state court.
There would remain, however, the question whether the case was
appropriate for judicial action. The principal distinction between
such a case and McPherson is that the way in which the electors are
frequent congressional debates over the years, and passions frequently rose high over
what was only of theoretical importance in every election save that of 1876. See id.,
chs. 2, 4; Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DxcK. L. REv. 321 (1961).
113. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227.
114. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15-18 (1964). 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) permits the rejection of electoral
votes even of electors whose appointments have been lawfully certified by proper state
authority if both houses of Congress "agree that such vote or votes have not been so
regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certified." Cf. J. DOUGHERTY,
supra note 112, at 235. No definition of "regularly given" is provided, and while Congress has thus far always recorded the electoral votes as actually cast, it might at some
time treat this clause as authorizing it to reject votes cast contrary to pledge or expectation. At most, this would seem only to cancel such votes and not to record them
in favor of the party candidates.
115. 146 U.S. I.
116. 146 U.S. at 23.
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chosen is committed by the Constitution to the states, while the way
in which the votes of the electors are counted may arguably be
regarded as having been committed to Congress. 117
In Coleman v. Miller/1 8 the Court held nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine the issue of whether a state legislature's
attempted ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment was
invalid either because of prior rejection by the same state or because
of an excessive lapse of time. The Court based its decision on "the
ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over
the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment." 119 But the
commitment to Congress is even less clear in the case of constitutional
amendments than it is in the case of presidential elections. Lapse of
time is usually provided for in the joint resolution proposing an
amendment, so perhaps the lack of such a clause in the child labor
amendment involved in the Coleman case may be regarded as raising
an issue for congressional determination. But there is not a whisper
in the language of the Constitution as to any function committed to
Congress in connection with the ratification of amendments it has
proposed to the states, and it may be assumed that an amendment
takes effect when a sufficient number of ratifications are reported
even if Congress is not in session at the time. On this basis, the argument for nonjusticiability would be even stronger in the presidential
election case than it was in Coleman.
On the other hand, the Court in Coleman stated: "In determining
whether a question falls within [the political question] category, the
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political departments and also the lack of
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations. "120 Viewed in the light of this pronouncement, the issue
is less clear. A decision by the courts rendered before transmission of
the electoral votes to Congress would not upset the finality of something Congress had already done; yet the possibility of conflict would
remain, since Congress might make its mvn determination at variance
with the decision of the Court. In any event, there would quite
clearly be "satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination" in the
case of an unfaithful elector; whether an elector is or is not obliged
117. In a recent case challenging the method used by the states in choosing electors
-specifically the general ticket system-the Supreme Court refused to entertain a
complaint brought before it pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Delaware v. New
York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966). No reason for the refusal was stated. See also Williams v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 37 U.S.L.W. 2065 (E.D. Va. July 16, 1968); Penton v.
Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
118. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
119. 307 U.S. at 450.
120. 307 U.S. at 454-55 (footnote omitted).
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to vote for the candidates of his party, and whether or not a specific
elector has in fact done so, are readily manageable judicial questions.
Returning to Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court's last word on the
problem, some guidance may have been intended by Justice Brennan's summary:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.121

The implication seems to be that if any one of these elements is
present, the courts should abstain. Some of them are at least arguably
involved in the counting of electoral votes. Whether that process
may be regarded as having been :finally committed to Congress has
been discussed above.122 Lack of respect for Congress might be harder
to find if the Court acted before Congress did. In any event, a judicial
decision would seemingly have to be rendered before Congress
counted the votes, or not at all; once a President was proclaimed by
Congress to have been elected, anything short of "unquestioning
adherence" to its decision would probably provoke a far more serious
crisis than that which the courts were seeking to avert.
This is not an attempt to analyze in depth the problem of whether
the issue of electors' independence is to be regarded as justiciable,
but merely an effort to show that the question is a close one, with no
assurance that a judicial determination could be obtained. Moreover,
even if such a determination were obtained, the possibility that an
elector would defy an injunction and vote contrary to his mandate
should not be overlooked; with the stakes so high, fear of contempt
proceedings might not prove to be a sufficient deterrent. A further
stretching of legal theory would be required in order to negate or
reverse a vote so cast.
As uncertain as the prospects appear for securing effective aid
from the courts to prevent electors from voting contrary to the
voters' expectations if the electors are cooperative enough to reveal
121. 369 U.S. at 127. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 591·96 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (opinion of Burger, J.).
122. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.

November 1968]

Presidential Elections

31

their intentions in advance, the problems would be magnified if
knowledge of their defection were to trickle out only after they had
cast their votes. It would then be too late to enjoin them from voting
in such fashion, and perhaps too late to enjoin the certifying officials
of their states from reporting their votes as cast. Even if an aberrant
vote could be nullified on some theory (thus dividing its effect in
half), could it be treated affirmatively as cast in accordance with the
expectations of the voters? Once the "list" of electoral votes has been
transmitted to Congress, against whom would a lawsuit be brought?
The purpose would have to be to control the counting of the electoral votes. But courts would obviously be most reluctant to issue
an injunction or mandamus against the President of the Senate123 or
the Congress as a whole. 124
Thus, in addition to the chance that our present electoral system
would give the presidency to the less popular candidate and the
danger of a stalemate in the House of Representatives, there is the
possible nightmare of a dispute over a "stolen" presidency. But while
this eventuality would be prevented by the proposed constitutional
amendment providing for direct popular election, there are other
ways of accomplishing the same result with perhaps fewer side effects.
Both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have advocated
the adoption of an amendment preserving the present method of
assigning electoral votes to the several states, but recording the electoral votes automatically upon the basis of the popular votes cast in
each state, eliminating the electors as such.125 As part of this plan, the
general ticket system-now universally employed by custom-would
become mandatory. 126 Originally gaining substantial support, including sponsorship by Senator Bayh and endorsement by the Bar Association of the City of New York, the proposal has more recently been
eclipsed by the strong drive in favor of direct popular election.
Nevertheless, it has the distinct virtue of completely eliminating the
problem of the straying elector without causing the shift in the
political balance of power discussed above. 127
Could Congress solve the problem without the necessity of a con123. One can imagine, in the 1968 election, a case entitled Humphrey v. Humphrey;
or Nixon v. Nixon in 1960.
124. "The Congress is the legislative department of the government; the President
is the executive department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to
its cognizance." Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 500 (1866).
125. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 363,91 (1961); Hearings, supra note 95, at 151-71; H.R. Doc. No. 364, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966).
126. See Hearings, supra note 125.
127. See text accompanying note 29 supra.

32

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:1

stitutional amendment? Would an act of Congress providing that all
electoral votes are to be counted as votes for the candidates of the
electors' respective parties be valid? Could such a statute at least
provide for this result in those states in which the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates appear on the ballots? (Or
where, in addition, the electors' names do not appear?) At the outset,
we are faced with the difficulty that the Constitution appears to
entrust the process of choosing electors to the discretion of the respective state legislatures. Congress is authorized only to "determine the
Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give
their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United
States."128 Otherwise, the process of selecting electors is committed to
the states, and, as pointed out above, need not even be by election. 120
A possible foothold may be found in the fact that the states are
obliged to transmit their lists to the President of the Senate, who
"shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.'' 130 It
is at least arguable that some power to decide how the votes are to be
counted is thereby conferred, ir not upon Congress per se in its legislative capacity, nevertheless upon the two houses of Congress in a
special vote-counting capacity.
Is this a sufficient basis for Congress to legislate? It should be
remembered that Congress is granted power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers [presumably the powers specifically enumerated in
article I, section 8], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.'' 131 The power to count electoral votes is a power
vested in the President of the Senate and the members of both houses
of Congress, all of whom are officers of the United States. Congress
presumably legislated on this basis when it prescribed the procedures
for resolution of the Hayes-Tilden controversy in 1876-1877,132 as
well as in enacting its permanent rules pertaining to the counting of
electoral votes.133
Assuming some power of Congress over the procedures governing
the count of electoral votes, does this power extend, beyond determining which of two contending slates of electors was validly chosen,
to the question of how to count the vote of an elector whose right
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § I.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
U.S. CoNsr. art II, § I.
U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
See note 113 supra.
See note 114 supra.
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to office is undisputed? Is there any basis for concluding that Congress may prescribe that the vote of an unfaithful elector shall be
counted as though he had voted for his party's candidate rather than
as he actually voted? It may well be that whatever Congress does in
this respect is immune from scrutiny by the courts. 134 But Senators
and Representatives, like judges, are bound by oath or affirmation
to support the Constitution135 and should, and presumably would,
act conscientiously in accordance with their conception of its requirements.
Even though the choice of electors is committed to the states,
Congress has been held to have at least some power in this realm.
In Ex Parte Yarbrough, 136 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of nvo Reconstruction statutes punishing conspiracies to
intimidate a person in the exercise of a constitutional right137 and
conspiracies to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, a citizen
entitled to vote from supporting a candidate for presidential elector
or Congress. 138 While the indictment in question involved only a
congressional election and was based on intimidation of Negro voters-undoubtedly a special case under the fifteenth amendmentthe reasoning of the Court went much further:
That a government whose essential character is republican, whose
executive head and legislative body are both elective, whose most
numerous and powerful branch of the legislature is elected by the
people directly, has no power by appropriate laws to secure this
election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud,
is a proposition so startling as to arrest attention and demand the
gravest consideration.
If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of
delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is
superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and
corruption .
. . . [T]he importance to the general government of having the
actual election-the voting for those members-free from force and
fraud is not diminished by the circumstance that the qualification of
the voter is determined by the law of the State where he votes. It
equally affects the government, it is as indispensable to the proper
discharge of the great function of legislating for that government,
that those who are to control this legislation shall not owe their
134. See text accompanying notes 110-24 supra.
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
136. ll0 U.S. 651 (1884).
1!17. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 116, § 6, 16 Stat. 141, the present equivalent of which
is 18 u.s.c. § 241 (1964).
138. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 14, which resembles the present
18 u.s.c. § 594 (1964).
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election to bribery or violence, whether the class of persons who
shall vote is determined by the law of the State, or by law of the
United States, or by their united result.
In a republican government, like ours, where political power is
reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen
at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control
these elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source
of danger.139
Again, in Burroughs v. United States, 140 the Court upheld a provision of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925141 requiring any
political committee accepting contributions or making expenditures
in two or more states for the purpose of influencing the election of
candidates for presidential elector to render certain financial reports.
The Court stated:
The congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity
of presidential and vice presidential elections. Neither in purpose
nor in effect does it interfere with the power of a state to appoint
electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made.
It deals with political committees organized for the purpose of influencing elections in two or more states, and with branches or subsidiaries of national committees, and excludes from its operation
state or local committees. Its operation, therefore, is confined to
situations which, if not beyond the power of the state to deal with
at all, are beyond its power to deal with adequately. It in no sense
invades any exclusive state power.
While presidential electors are not officers or agents of the federal
government (In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379), they exercise federal
functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States. The President is
vested with the executive power of the nation. The importance of
his election and the vital character of its relationship to and effect
upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too
strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper
use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a
vital particular the power of self protection. Congress, undoubtedly,
possesses that power, as it possesses every other power essential to
preserve the departments and institutions of the general government
from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by
corruption.142
The Court has also held that Congress may make the miscounting
of votes in congressional elections and primaries a federal crime.143
While such cases rest upon the express grant of power to Congress
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

ll0 U.S. at 657-58, 663, 666.
290 U.S. 534 (1934).
2 u.s.c. §§ 241-56 (1964).
290 U.S. at 544-45.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. !171
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to regulate "the Times, Places and Manner of holding elections for
Senators and Representatives, " 144 and although there is no corre•
sponding grant of power with respect to selection of electors, the inherent power of the federal government to protect the election of its
officials from corruption, discussed in Yarbrough and Burroughs,
would seem applicable where votes for presidential electors are
fraudulently counted.
But of what avail is it to be able to protect a voter against interference with the casting or counting of his ballot in the first
stage of the process-the choosing of electors-if Congress cannot
ensure that his vote will be effective in the election of the President?
It would of course be easier to sustain a federal statute punishing
bribery of presidential electors designed to reverse the popular
choice than it would be to uphold one punishing such an effort
based on political persuasion. It would be still more difficult to
uphold a statute which, in either circumstance, substituted for the
electoral votes cast the votes which would have been cast if the
electors had been faithful to their trust. (It would be easier to make
bribery of a Senator a crime than to nullify, after the fact, the vote
of a Senator who has been bribed.) Yet Congress might well conclude
that the stakes in the choice of the President are sufficiently high
that no criminal sanction consistent with the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment would deter an errant
elector who had both the desire and the reason to believe that his
vote might be decisive; nothing short of nullification of the unfaithful vote would ensure the effectuation of the voters' wishes. Such
a judgment on the part of Congress would seem well within the
range of the necessary and proper clause.ms
Such a statute need not ride completely roughshod over the
power accorded the states to choose the means by which their
electors are "appointed." If a state should choose to revert to the
once-frequent practice of entrusting the choice of electors to its legislature, or if its ballot should list only the names of the electors
without those of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates,
the voters might not be deceived if an elector were to ignore his
(1879). In United States v. Mosely, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915), Justice Holmes stated: "We
regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as
open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in the box."
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
145. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934):
The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice President
from corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question
primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress. If it can be seen that the
means adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their
necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the rela•
tionship of the means adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination alone.

36

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:1

mandate; in either case there would perhaps be no authority for
congressional interference.146 But where the ballot names the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, a gross deception is practiced upon the voters if any of the chosen electors votes contrary to
expectation. Would not the sanctity of the ballot be protected by
legislation nullifying the vote of an unfaithful elector just as it is by
legislation forbidding the miscounting of votes?147 Such legislation
would be unconstitutional only if one reads into the constitutional
provision empowering electors to choose the President a rigid rule
that nothing may interfere with the electors' discretionary power.
Legislation injected into so delicate an area as the choice of
the President would be much more salutary if enacted to provide
for future eventualities rather than directed to an existing election
controversy. And if such a law were once enacted, it would be unfortunate for Congress to overturn it in order to favor one of
several candidates in a specific controversy. Yet as matters now stand,
such an eventuality is possible. The twentieth amendment provides
that the new Congress shall take office on January 3, while a federal
statute148 prescribes the counting of electoral votes on January 6;
repeal or amendment of a previously enacted law to achieve ad hoc
purposes would thus be conceivable between January 3 and 6. But
the likelihood of obtaining acquiescence of both houses of Congress
and the President (or two-thirds of both houses without the President) in that short a time would be small indeed, especially at a
time when, by hypothesis, a close presidential vote had just taken
place.
146. Cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); a state may be under no
constitutional obligation to provide primary elections, but if it does they fall within
the reach of congressional regulatory power.
147. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment may serve as an alternative basis of
congressional power. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Some doubt arises,
however, as to which provision of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment Congress
would be enforcing. If all voters are denied an effective vote for President, the equal
protection clause may be inapplicable. The right to cast a meaningful vote, however,
may be protected as a "liberty" under the due process clause. And, while there is no
Supreme Court holding presently extant finding a violation of the privileges and
immunities clause, the right to vote for President might fall within the test suggested
in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873), as among those "which
owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Constitu•
tion, or its laws." But cf. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904). Perhaps an argument
could also be based on the rights of citizenship conferred by the first sentence of the
fourteenth amendment. Cf. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964). In invalidating
the Ohio laws that made it difficult for third-party candidates to appear on the ballot,
the Supreme Court recently held that the equal protection clause protects "the right
of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.'' Williams v. Rhodes, 37 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4003 (Oct. 15, 1968). 37 U.S.L.W. at
4006. Whether it follows that the fourteenth amendment forbids breaches of faith
by presidential electors, as a denial of the right to cast effective votes, a determination
by Congress that such conduct violates the fourteenth amendment might be upheld.
148. 3 u.s.c. § 15 (1964).
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Assuming such a statute was not repealed, is there any assurance
that Congress as legislature can bind Congress as vote-counter? Even
if there were a law directing a count of electoral votes in accordance
·with the voters' intentions, could the two houses, in joint session,
nevertheless revert to counting the electoral votes as actually cast?
Is there any way, short of a constitutional amendment dispensing
with any action by the electors or Congress, for "Congress sober"
to guard against "Congress drunk"?
One possible solution is the inclusion in the statute of a provision for expedited judicial review of any action in the course of
vote counting contrary to the statutory mandate. Original jurisdiction (with appropriate enforcement power) could be vested in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, perhaps a threejudge court, with direct expedited appeal to the Supreme Court.
I revert to the earlier discussion of whether questions pertaining
to the counting of electoral votes are justiciable, or whether they fall
instead into the "political question" category because they are regarded as entrusted by the Constitution to final determination by
Congress. 149 Suppose it is decided that these questions fall into the
latter category, but Congress enacts legislation designed to confer
upon the judiciary the authority, indeed the obligation, to pass
upon them. Would such a jurisdictional grant be constitutional?
Can Congress confer upon the judiciary a power to decide questions
which, in the absence of such legislation, would be deemed inappropiate for judicial decision as "political" in nature? Is the "political question" doctrine a constitutional command or merely a judicially created rule of practice?
This issue seems not to have come before the Supreme Court; 150
moreover, it may not be susceptible of a single answer. To the
extent that the "political question" characterization reflects a determination that the case involves issues or requires remedies so
different from those usually considered by courts that the constitu149. See text accompanying notes 110-22 supra.
150. An unsuccessful attempt to raise such an issue was made by appellants' counsel
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
956 (1968). The Supreme Court had previously held that the "act of state" doctrine
prevented the courts from examining the validity of certain acts of the Cuban
Government. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The "Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(e){2) (Supp. III 1968) provided, in part, that
"no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of
international law••. .'' On remand, the Banco Nacional de Cuba contended that this
was an unconstitutional attempt to confer upon the courts jurisdiction over nonjusticiable questions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted the
Sabbatino decision as not based upon the Constitution, but as a choice "among a
number of constitutionally permissible alternative rules" (383 F.2d at 181), and
proceeded to apply the modifying statute.
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tional requirement of "case or controversy"151 is lacking, no act of
Congress can create jurisdiction.152 On the other hand, where a decision of nonjusticiability is based on notions of convenience, propriety, or deference to Congress not constitutionally compelled,
Congress can presumably free the courts from their self-imposed reticence.153 Much can be said for the conclusion that such legislation
would be valid. A "judicially manageable standard" would have
been provided, and a case or controversy-at least to the extent that
there would be a real adversary proceeding leading to a final meaningful judgment-would be present. Any qualms based upon the
unseemliness and possible ineffectiveness of an attempt by the courts
to give directions to Congress154 would be answered by reference
to the fact that Congress itself had consented to the courts' action.
In short, it would seem that there are a number of ways of
coping with the problem of a "theft" of the presidency by independent action on the part of the electors. This problem may be dealt
with alone; it need not be part of an omnibus reform-such as the
direct popular vote proposal-which would change the political
balance of power in the country, possibly in a direction which
would prove disastrous. The Court might hold electors bound to
respect the choice of the voters without further legislation or constitutional amendment; but we cannot be sure. A legislative solution
is possible; but its effectiveness could never be completely free from
doubt, and it is most important that any possibility of a disputed
presidency be avoided. Such legislation might serve as a temporary
expedient, however, pending adoption of a constitutional amendment expressly removing the discretion of electors or, preferably,
providing for counting electoral votes automatically. Thus, although
changes in the present method of electing our Presidents are urgently needed, an amendment providing for direct popular election is neither the only, nor the best, solution.
151. U.S. CoNsr. art. Ill, § 2.
152. Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
153. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). This may be true even
if the bar to court action is found in the Constitution-not in the lack of a case or
controversy under article m, but in the sense that the Constitution has conferred
final decision-making power upon Congress. Conceivably, Congress might be deemed
empowered to withdraw that barrier to court action. (This would clearly not be possible if the function involved were inherently of a nonjudicial nature, such as the
determination whether to enact legislation or ratify a treaty; but it may be possible
where the types of questions to be considered and relief requested are similar to those
often coming before courts.)
Perhaps there is an analogy to be found in the areas of state interference with
interstate commerce and intergovernmental immunities: courts have held state action
to violate the Constitution in the absence of congressional expression, but Congress
may legislate to remove the barrier. Compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), with
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
154. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (opinion of
Burger, J.).

